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SPIES, SUBVERSIVES, TERRORISTS AND THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT: FREE SPEECH AND OTHER CASUALTIES
GRAHAM ZELLICK*
INTRODUCTION
I invite you to follow me for a moment into a fantasy world and
imagine, if you will, a state in which the following description
holds true: It is a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment,
for any state official to disclose to anyone, even a politician, certain
categories of information acquired in the course of the official's
work, even if it reveals wrongdoing by others; and it is an offence
for a newspaper to receive such information and publish it, even if
it uncovers illegality in government. In general the government de-
clines to answer questions about the secret service and the service
is subject to no legislative supervision. The service's officers may
be authorised by the Minister of the Interior to break into private
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Queen Mary College, University of London. Dean of the Faculty of Laws, University of
London, 1986-88. This is a revised version of the George Wythe Lecture delivered at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., on
Sept. 21, 1989. I wish to thank the President and Fellows of St. John's College, Oxford, for
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property, remove papers, plant bugs and so on. They similarly may
be authorised to tap telephones or intercept mail. The government,
without prior consultation, has instructed those public servants
who work in the department that monitors international radio
communications to resign from their trade union or face dismissal.
The Interior Minister recently directed both state and indepen-
dent radio and television that certain political parties in the coun-
try, and those who support them, not be allowed to speak on radio
or television on behalf of their party on any subject whatever. The
government also has powers of internal exile over those citizens
judged to be dissidents and suspected of engaging in subversive
activities, and can arrest them and hold them without charge, on
ministerial authority, for seven days. The Deputy Interior Minister
recently said that the press was "on probation": It had a year or
two to clean up its act, or else the government would introduce
legislation.
Do I have a vivid imagination, or do I speak perhaps of some
nameless South American tyranny, authoritarian Eastern bloc na-
tion, or repressive Middle East state? Let us not trouble to locate
this place, whether in my imagination or geographically, for the
moment, but return to the United Kingdom. We can revert to this
mythic country later.
I devote this Article to four British statutes: the Interception of
Communications Act 1985,1 the Official Secrets Act,2 the Security
Service Act' and the Prevention of Terrorism Act,4 all 1989. I shall
begin, however, with two government decisions, one bearing on the
media, the other on a group of civil servants.
The Article focuses on the British Government's powers and the
use it makes of them, rather than on the courts, which I have con-
sidered elsewhere.5 Inevitably, I shall advert to judicial decisions,
but not as a central theme. Consequently, the government's pur-
suit of retired intelligence officer Peter Wright through the world's
1. Interception of Communications Act 1985, ch. 56.
2. Official Secrets Act 1989, ch. 6.
3. Security Service Act 1989, ch. 5.
4. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, ch. 4.
5. See Zellick, Official Information, National Security and the Law in Britain, XCVIII
STUDI SENESI 303 (1986).
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courts-the celebrated Spycatcher6 saga that culminated in a
House of Lords judgment in October 1989 7 -will feature here only
incidentally, and I shall not, therefore, take the opportunity to
venture an extended exegesis of the courts' role in that sorry tale.8
I. BROADCASTING BAN ON NORTHERN IRISH TERRORIST
SUPPORTERS
On October 19, 1988, the Home Secretary made the following
order:
1.... I hereby require the Independent Broadcasting Au-
thority [IBA] [and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)]
to refrain from broadcasting any matter which consists of or
includes:
any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or dis-
cussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on the
programme in which the matter is broadcast where-
(a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to
represent an organisation specified in paragraph 2 below, or
(b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such an
organisation,
other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.
6. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER. THE CANDID AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OF-
FICER (1987).
7. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 638. See
THE SPYCATCHER CASES (M. Fysh ed. 1989) for the texts of the judgments of the English,
Australian, Hong Kong and New Zealand courts. The European Commission of Human
Rights has declared admissible and is now considering on the merits applications by three
British national newspapers alleging breaches of the European Convention on Human
Rights. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PRESS COMMUNIQU-HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, No. 112 (May 10,
1989) (announcing admissibility of two cases: Times Newspapers Ltd. and Neil v. U.K., Ap-
plic. No. 13166/87 and The Observer Ltd. and Guardian Newspaper Ltd. v. U.K., Applic.
No. 13585/88).
8. See, e.g., Barendt, Spycatcher and Freedom of Speech [1989] PuB. L. 204; Bradley,
[1988] ALL ER. ANN. REV. 55; Burnet and Thomas, Spycatcher-The Commodification of
Truth, 16 J.L. & Soc'Y 210 (1989); Pannick, Spycatcher: Two Years of Legal Indignations,
in ECONOMICAL WITH THE TRUTH: THE LAW AND THE MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 17
(1990) (Kingsford-Smith & Oliver eds.); see also Lord Advocate v. Scotsman Publications
Ltd. [1989] 2 All E.R. 852; Birks, A Lifelong Obligation of Confidence, 105 L.Q. REV. 501
(1989).
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2. The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 above are-
a. any organisation which is for the time being a proscribed
organisation for the purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 or the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and
b. Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence
Association.
3. The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words
spoken-
(a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or
(b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, Euro-
pean Parliamentary or local election pending that election.
The Home Secretary was acting under section 29(3) of the Broad-
casting Act 1981' and clause 13(4) of the BBC's Licence and
Agreement,10 the former of which reads: "[T]he Secretary of State
may at any time by notice in writing require the [Independent
Broadcasting] Authority to refrain from broadcasting any matter
or classes of matter specified in the notice; and it shall be the duty
of the Authority to comply with the notice."" Clause 13(4) of the
Licence and Agreement is in virtually identical terms. The IBA
and BBC are entitled to announce that they are subject to such an
order. 2
Neither the BBC nor IBA sought to challenge the order in the
courts. Instead, a group of distinguished journalists, with the back-
ing of the National Union of Journalists, applied for judicial re-
view, seeking a declaration that the notice was ultra vires and
void, and an order of certiorari to quash it.
A unanimous Divisional Court and Court of Appeal declined to
hold the Home Secretary's orders unlawful.' 3 The Court of Appeal,
9. Broadcasting Act 1981, ch. 68, § 29(3).
10. HoME OFFICE, BROADCASTING: COPY OF THE LICENCE AND AGREEMENT DATED THE 2ND
DAY OF APRIL 1981 BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPART-
MENT AND THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION 9, CMND. 8233 (1981) [hereinafter LI-
CENCE AND AGREEMENT].
11. Broadcasting Act 1981, ch. 68, § 29(3).
12. Id. § 29(4); LICENCE AND AGREEMENT, supra note 10, c. 13(4).
13. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1990] 1 All E.R.
469; Convention limits on minister's power, The Times (London), May 30, 1989, at 30, coL
1; 139 NEW L.J. 1229 (1989) (D.C.); see de Smith, Broadcasting and Northern Ireland: con-
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SPIES, SUBVERSIVES, TERRORISTS
differing from the Divisional Court, rejected the contention that, in
exercising his powers, the Home Secretary was required to be
mindful of and conform to article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression, includ-
ing the right "to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority." '14 The Divisional Court had held
that the Home Secretary had not infringed article 10, because arti-
cle 10(2) permitted restrictions on freedom of expression "in the
interests of national security . . . public safety . . . [and] for the
prevention of disorder or crime." 15
In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Home Secretary's
orders were in no way vulnerable to challenge. As Lord Donaldson
of Lymington, M.R., summed up:
A decision whether or not to give directives ... involves the
Home Secretary in making a delicate and difficult political judg-
ment .... [I]t is a judgment to be made by the Home Secretary
and not by the courts, whose right and duty to intervene only
arises in the event that the Home Secretary reaches an untena-
ble decision in the sense that he can be shown to have taken
account of matters which are irrelevant or failed to take account
of matters which were relevant or in which the decision is mani-
festly wrong as falling outside the wide spectrum of rational
conclusions.' 6
The government has given only five previous directions under
these powers,17 two of which remain in force: One prohibits matter
that uses subliminal techniques;' 8 the other prevents the BBC
from broadcasting its own opinion on current affairs or matters of
public policy. 19 In 1928, the government withdrew a 1927 direction
not to broadcast matters of political, industrial or religious contro-
stitutional issues? 139 NEw L.J. 1240 (1989); Thompson, Broadcasting and Terrorism
[1989] PuB. L. 527.
14. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 10(1).
15. Id. art. 10(2); see 139 NEw L.J. 1229, 1230 (1989); [1990] 1 All E.R. 469, 477-78.
16. [1990] 1 All E.R. 469, 481.
17. See REPORT OF THE COMMIrrr ON THE FuTURE OF BROADCASTING, para. 5.10, CMN.
6753 (1977) (Chairman: Lord Annan) [hereinafter ANNAN REPORT].
18. Id.
19. Id.
1990]
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versy; ° cancelled the so-called "14-day Rule," which prohibited
the broadcast of programmes dealing with matters to be debated in
Parliament during the ensuing fourteen days;21 and cancelled a
prohibition on controversial party political broadcasts otherwise
than arranged by agreement with the major parties.2
In retrospect, all three of these seem outrageous. They emascu-
lated the broadcasting media and represented a gross and un-
pardonable interference by government. Of course, television was
then a new medium whose novelty undoubtedly aroused fears and
anxieties. It had yet to establish itself as an essential part of the
press. But today, television has achieved that status and for many
people is their principal and often only source of news and infor-
mation. How should the Home Secretary's ban be judged?
"Those who practise and support terrorism and violence should
not be allowed direct access to our radios and television screens, '23
the Home Secretary told the House of Commons, emphasising that
broadcasters remained at liberty to report the actual words like
their newspaper counterparts-only direct access was prohib-
ited-and that the ban did not apply to parliamentary proceedings
or election campaigns. (A similar ban has been in force in the Irish
Republic since 1960.4) The government justified the ban on the
grounds that appearances on radio and television by supporters of
terrorism in Northern Ireland caused offence and outrage, espe-
cially in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident, added to
the terrorists' authority and standing, attracted support to their
cause and spread fear in the community.25 The objections, put with
force in Parliament by the Opposition and even some Conservative
members, cannot be so shortly stated, although in the home of the
first amendment where such a ban must seem extraordinary, they
may seem supererogatory.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1073, 1075 (1988).
24. Irish Broadcasting Authority Act 1960, § 31(1); see State (Lynch) v. Cooney [1982]
I.R. 337 (Ir. Sup. Ct.).
25. See 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1073, 1079-80 (1988); 138 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)
893, 893 (1988); see also, O'Brien, Freedom to peddle murder, The Times (London), Sept.
16, 1989, at 10, col. 3; McKittrick, Ban denies Sinn Fein its oxygen, The Independent
(London), Oct. 18, 1989, at 21, col. 1.
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The government has not argued seriously that the ban will mate-
rially damage the terrorists or promote security. It serves largely to
protect feelings. Was there a real problem? In the year preceding
its introduction, independent television apparently broadcast eight
minutes of material now covered by the ban. The ban applies only
to terrorism with an Irish flavour; yet the United Kingdom has also
been home to terrorist outrages emanating from far-flung parts of
the world. What allows the government to discriminate between
Sinn Fein, which is not itself a terrorist organisation and whose
words would not be outside the law, and, for example, the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization or spokesmen for foreign govern-
ments that sponsor, support, facilitate or practise international ter-
rorism? Will the ban be extended at some point to such persons?
And if it extends to them, why not to other parties or groups that
cause offence, outrage or spread fear? Sinn Fein after all is not, as
the Irish Republican Army is, a proscribed organisation; it plays a
prominent role in the political life of Ulster, with fifty-nine elected
councillors, one Member of the Westminster Parliament and sizea-
ble public support. As a result of this ban, Sinn Fein is no longer
treated like any other political party in the United Kingdom. In
depriving it of one weapon, Sinn Fein has been handed a more
powerful one: It and the terrorists will now be able to claim-not
least in the United States-that they are denied access to the
broadcast media and the opportunity to present their case, and
that they are the victims of state repression by being explicitly ex-
cluded from the full democratic process. Such an argument will
help rather than hinder the terrorists' case. On this ground alone,
the ban is profoundly misconceived. In short, in the words of a
senior television executive, "To permit a party to stand for a dem-
ocratic election and then outlaw its access to the media puts a dan-
gerous strain on the laws governing broadcasting which were never
designed for such a purpose."2
Such a ban also lends itself as a justification for repressive and
authoritarian regulation and controls elsewhere, and was indeed
used for that purpose by the President of South Africa. It is also
likely to be seen abroad, even if wrongly, as damaging a priceless
26. Forgan, A gag hurts us all, The Times (London), Nov. 5, 1988, at 10, col. 2 (Forgan is
Director of Programmes, Channel 4 Television).
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commodity-the independence and integrity of the BBC; and it
undermines the Foreign Office's insistence, in the face of frequent
complaints by other governments, that the BBC is independent
and not subject to government control or direction. Finally, the ac-
tual scope and wording of the ban may be criticised. The ban is
not limited to words that express support for terrorism or ter-
rorists: The actual subject matter of the words is irrelevant. Ac-
cording to the government, however, a Sinn Fein councillor speak-
ing about some local matter as a member of the council and not as
a member of the party would be outside the ban.17 The ban per-
mits visual images with the words spoken by someone else, al-
though it is not immediately apparent in what way the outrage or
offence is lessened simply because a broadcast journalist reads the
words. Is it not possible that the words thereby acquire greater au-
thority? The ban also covers material filmed years before that
could shed light on the history of and background to the contem-
porary scene. It must also be asked what evidence suggests that
exposing people to the public on television necessarily enhances
their standing or authority.
I find the government's case weak and unpersuasive, and what
little merit lay in the proposal is overwhelmed by the contrary ar-
guments. In any case, so gross and flagrant an interference with
freedom of the press requires compelling justification. As the Dep-
uty Director-General of the BBC wrote:
British broadcast journalism is the latest victim of terrorism. Af-
ter two decades of terrorism in Northern Ireland, our govern-
ment has finally adopted a measure which may or may not
counter terrorism but which inflicts certain damage on some of
the most cherished elements of a democratic society-freedom
of expression and the independence of the media.28
The English courts may have been correct in holding that, in view
of the amplitude of the power given, the Home Secretary's decision
was not so perverse, irrational and unreasonable as to make it un-
lawful. 9 But it is doubtful that his order satisfies the test under
27. This was made clear to the BBC in a letter from the Home Office dated Oct. 24, 1988.
28. John Birt, Gagging the Messenger, The Independent (London), Nov. 21, 1988, at 21,
col. 4; see Michael, Attacking the Easy Platform, 138 NEw L.J. 786 (1988).
29. See supra notes 13, 16 and accompanying text.
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the text and jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human
Rights that there must be a "pressing social need" in a democratic
society to impose such a ban in the interests of national security or
for the prevention of crime.3 Even if the ban is lawful under Eng-
lish law, in my view, it violates the European Convention. This
view is shared by Geoffrey Robertson, Q.C.: "[A] total prohibition
on television and radio appearances by representatives of a lawful
political organisation, for example where they are elected local
councillors speaking about domestic issues, can hardly be justified
on the grounds of national security or prevention of public disor-
der."3 1 I also take the view that there is no longer any place for
section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act or its BBC counterpart,
which treats broadcasting differently from newspapers and which
gives the government a power that no government in a democratic
society should have. Such a power is unnecessary and dangerous. It
is capable of being used to prohibit particular programmes that the
Home Secretary finds objectionable, although in the two known
cases in which Ministers have communicated their concerns, the
formal power has not been invoked. 2
Of course, some things are better not televised. Editorial judg-
ments must be made every day, in television as in the press; televi-
sion is subject to internal controls and regulatory authorities that
represent the public interest. If an occasional mistake or error of
judgment is made, so be it: The walls will not fall in. But such
decisions are forbidden territory to government. This, of course, is
axiomatic in the United States, but not in Britain. The Home Sec-
retary has said that his ban will make broadcasters' tasks easier:
They will be relieved of difficult decisions and will know precisely
where they stand. But it is not the government's business to make
the life of programme-makers easier. The ban was ill-judged, and
the failure of the broadcasting authorities and companies to mount
any challenge-either in the British courts or under the European
30. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see e.g.,
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 277, para.
62 (1979).
31. G. ROBERTSON, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 94 (6th ed. 1989).
32. See id. at 229; ANNAN REPORT, supra note 17, para. 5.11.
1990]
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Convention-is regrettable,33 especially because the Divisional
Court attached some significance to this failure. Freedom is only
safe if those who have custody of it treat it as a solemn trust and
fight to vindicate it whenever and however it is threatened.
II. THE TRADE UNION BAN AT GCHQ
The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a
civilian security and intelligence agency with 7,000 staff concerned
with military and official communications, and signals intelligence
around the world.3 4 From its establishment in 1947, its staff were
permitted to join trade unions, and more than sixty percent did
SO. 35
The staff are all civil servants, appointed under the royal prerog-
ative as regulated by an Order-in-Council, but subject to various
statutory provisions on employment unless a ministerial certificate
expressly excludes them "for the purpose of safeguarding national
security."3 6
After seven incidents of industrial unrest between 1979 and
1981, followed by twenty months of no industrial unrest, the Prime
Minister, acting as Minister for the Civil Service, decided that con-
tinued membership by GCHQ staff in national trade unions was
inimical to national security and that the right of union member-
ship should be abrogated. 7 This would bring GCHQ staff into line
with the other security and intelligence agencies. Without any
prior consultation or discussion with the trade unions or staff, the
Foreign Secretary accordingly issued the necessary certificates and
informed the House of Commons. GCHQ staff were informed of
the change in their terms of service and warned that industrial un-
rest could lead to disciplinary action. Those not wishing to remain
at GCHQ could seek a transfer elsewhere in the Civil Service, but
33. See Lord Bonham-Carter (former Vice-Chairman of the BBC), The broadcasters'
astonishing failure to defend free speech, The Independent (London), Jan. 12, 1989, at 22,
col. 3. The chairman of the BBC has, however, condemned the ban. Gibb, BBC Attacks Ban
Over IRA, The Times (London), Oct. 12, 1989, at 2, col. 15.
34. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] A.C. 374, 394.
35. Id.
36. Employment Protection Act 1975, ch. 71, § 121(4); Employment Protection (Consoli-
dation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 138(4).
37. Council of Civil Serv. Unions, A.C. at 394-96.
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if this were not possible, premature retirement or redundancy com-
pensation would be available. Staff who remained would receive
£1,000 for their lost right, and could establish and join a staff asso-
ciation instead. All but about thirty-five persons accepted the new
terms.
The decision was challenged at the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO), in the English courts and under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Although this Article is not primarily
about the courts' role in relation to national security, it is neces-
sary to mention briefly the course of events.
An ILO committee found the decision to be in breach of the
1948 ILO Convention on Freedom of Association, but subsequent
proceedings were inconclusive."' The High Court in England
granted relief on an application for judicial review because the ab-
sence of prior consultation vitiated the staff's legitimate expecta-
tion that the government would consult them before it introduced
such a change.39 The Court of Appeal reversed this decision40 and
the House of Lords subsequently upheld the reversal.41 The House
of Lords found that the legitimate expectation arising from the
government's duty to act fairly had to yield to the requirements of
national security, accepting the government's argument that prior
consultation would have risked the very industrial unrest the gov-
ernment was at pains to avoid and put national security in jeop-
ardy.42 The House of Lords' decision is notable in affirming that
decisions taken under prerogative powers are in principle review-
able and in establishing, in theory at least, a somewhat more rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny of executive claims to national security than
had hitherto been the case.43
I am not without sympathy for the government's position, but its
action was clumsy and inept and went further than necessary. The
argument that prior consultation would itself have precipitated in-
dustrial unrest and undermined GCHQ's operational capability is
hollow. If industrial unrest were thought to be the likely result of
38. See Ewing, British labour law and the ILO, 139 NEW L.J. 1680 (1989).
39. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1984] I.R.L.R. 309.
40. [1984] I.R.L.R. 353.
41. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] A.C. 374.
42. Id. at 401-02.
43. Id. at 397-400.
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an intimation by the government that some change was contem-
plated, why should it not also have been likely-indeed, more
likely-on learning of the cancellation of their trade union rights
as a fait accompli? The staff were no more vulnerable in the latter
situation. If the government had been correct in its anticipation, it
then would have been entitled to move swiftly to implement the
change and take firm disciplinary action against those responsible.
Moreover, the extreme step of withdrawing trade union member-
ship was not the only or the most obvious solution open to the
government. It instead could have negotiated a no-strike or no-in-
dustrial action agreement with the unions (to which they were, in-
cidentally, agreeable), again contingent on its strict observance. At
the first breach, trade union membership would go. This minimal-
ist approach would have been more respectful of industrial and
collective rights and more proportionate to the potential mischief.
The government went too far and destroyed a civil liberty without
adequate justification.
So what did the European Commission of Human Rights have to
say of the principal complaint that the government's action vio-
lated article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
under which "[e]veryone has the right ... to freedom of associa-
tion with others, including the right to form and to join trade un-
ions for the protection of his interests." '44 The right to freedom of
association is subject to the usual limitations permissible "in the
interests of national security"4 5 and, more particularly: "This Arti-
cle shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the
police or of the administration of the State."4
The Commission accepted that the GCHQ staff fell within the
phrase "members . . . of the administration of the State."4 Was
the restriction "lawful"? The word "lawful" did not imply or sub-
sume the concept of being "necessary in a democratic society" that
qualifies the earlier part of the paragraph," and even if it required
44. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 11(1).
45. Id. art. 11(2).
46. Id.
47. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. United Kingdom, 10 E.H.R.R. 269, 287-91 (1988),
Applic. No. 11603/85.
48. Id. at 288.
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something more than a mere basis in national law, such as an ab-
sence of arbitrariness, that condition was met, as states must be
accorded a wide discretion when protecting their national security.
For that reason and because the restriction was also in accordance
with national law, the Commission found the ban "lawful. '49 The
Commission therefore found it unnecessary to determine whether
the ban was also justified under the national security qualification
in the first part of article 11(2).50 It accordingly declared the appli-
cation inadmissible. 1
Because the Convention clearly contemplates that states may
subject public servants to additional or more stringent restrictions
than other workers, and in this case the state permitted the GCHQ
staff to form a staff association in lieu of union membership, the
Commission appears to have interpreted and applied the Conven-
tion correctly. The Convention, however, unfortunately couples
civil servants with members of the armed forces and the police,
with whom civil servants have little in common. Neither the Euro-
pean Social Charter 2 nor the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights53 does so in their corresponding provisions . 4 It
would be far better to omit the reference to "members . . .of the
administration of the State" from the second sentence of article
11(2) and determine a case such as this in accordance with the first
sentence, on whether the restriction was "necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security."
III. TELEPHONE TAPPING AND MAr INTERCEPTION
Until 1985, telephone tapping by the police and Security Service
operated outside any legal regime because telephone tapping was
not unlawful under English law.5 5 There was, however, a practice
49. Id. at 290.
50. Id. at 290-91.
51. Id. at 291.
52. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Treaty Series No. 38, CmND. 2643, art. 5.
53. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, art. 22(2).
54. See J. FAWCEwr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS
284-85 (2d ed. 1987).
55. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r [1979] ch. 344; cf. R. v. Secretary of State for
the Home Dep't, ex parte Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518 (Secretary of State was not guilty
of misfeasance in office for not applying criteria pertaining to interception of communica-
tions that the Home Office had adopted).
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under which the Home and Foreign Secretaries issued so-called
warrants. English law, unlike American law, drew no distinction
between electronic surveillance for ordinary criminal investigations
and law enforcement, on the one hand, and national security pur-
poses on the other, the latter being further subdivided into surveil-
lance of domestic activities and of foreign powers. All were treated
alike and subject to the same general regime. Not surprisingly, the
absence of any legal controls did not find favour with the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights,5" and the government had no choice
but to legislate, the result being the Interception of Communica-
tions Act 1985.
The Act makes tapping a telephone or interfering with mail a
criminal offence 57 unless a Secretary of State has issued a war-
rant," which may be issued if it is necessary on any of the follow-
ing grounds: "(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the
purpose of preventing or detecting 'serious crime'; or (c) for the
purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom."59 National security is left undefined. A crime is "seri-
ous" if it involves violence, results in substantial financial gain or
involves a large number of persons in pursuit of a common goal, or
for which a person without previous convictions "could reasonably
be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three
years or more."60 The last ground relating to the country's "eco-
nomic well-being" was apparently so sensitive that scarcely any
words of explanation could be offered to Parliament during the
bill's passage,6 1 although one example was interruption of oil
supplies.
The Act also establishes a Tribunal 2 composed of lawyers,6" to
which persons who suspect that their telephones are tapped or
their letters intercepted may complain. 4 If a warrant is in force in
56. Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 7 E.H.R.R. 14 (1984).
57. Interception of Communications Act 1985, ch. 56, § 1(1).
58. Id. § 1(2)(a).
59. Id. § 2(2).
60. Id. § 10(3).
61. See 464 PAL. DEB., H.L. 879 (5th ser.) (1985).
62. Interception of Communications Act 1985, ch. 56, § 7, and sched. 1.
63. Id. sched. 7, para. 1(1).
64. Id. § 7(2).
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respect of that person's mail or telephone, the Tribunal can apply
judicial review principles65 and investigate whether the Secretary
of State should have issued that warrant and whether he has ob-
served all the procedures, safeguards and arrangements laid down
in the Act."' The Tribunal must inform the applicant of any in-
fringements and report to the Prime Minister.6 7 It may also quash
the warrant, direct destruction of the intercepted material and or-
der the Secretary of State to pay compensation to the applicant.6
So far the Tribunal has found no contravention.
If no warrant is in force, or if a warrant is in force but the Tribu-
nal discovers no infringements, it will simply tell the applicant that
it has found no infringements.6 9 The applicant will not be able to
discover whether his telephone has been tapped and, if so, whether
lawfully or otherwise. The government's rationale is that individu-
als should not be able to ascertain routinely whether they were
subject to a warrant or not. If telephone calls or letters are being
intercepted without a warrant, that is not a matter for the Tribu-
nal or the government. It is a criminal offence and investigation
lies with the police, as with any other criminal offence.
The Act, however, overlooks the fact that public disquiet has
centered chiefly on unauthorised taps, thought by some to be ex-
tensive, rather than on the relatively small number authorised by
warrant. Also, to expect the police to investigate taps when they
themselves or their colleagues in the Security Service are probably
conducting them is absurd.
Under the Act, the Tribunal's decisions are effectively "judge-
proof. '7 0 The Act also excludes any evidence or cross-examination
in any court or tribunal as to whether a warrant was in force or a
telephone had been tapped."' The Act, therefore, does very little to
assuage concern about unauthorised but "official" taps, other than
to make such taps a criminal offence. This alone will possibly im-
pel investigators, whether in the police or Security Service, to seek
65. Id. § 7(4).
66. Id. § 7(3).
67. Id. § 7(4).
68. Id. § 7(5).
69. Id. § 7(7).
70. Id. § 7(8).
71. Id. § 9.
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authorisation in all cases rather than run the risk, albeit remote, of
apprehension and prosecution. We may never know, of course, be-
cause the present extent of such unauthorised taps is a matter of
conjecture, and practice under the new Act will remain a mystery.
In addition to the Tribunal, the Act requires the Prime Minister
to appoint a Commissioner from the ranks of the senior judiciary
to keep under general review the issuing of warrants and all related
matters. 2 the Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime
Minister,73 which, subject to deletions in the interest of national
security and so on, 4 is laid before Parliament. 5
The Commissioner examines all counter-subversion warrants,
but only a random sample of others. So far, he has not found any
warrant to have been improperly issued, although in some cases
the wrong telephone has been tapped. He applies the principles
appropriate to judicial review,7 6 which is the approach imposed on
the Tribunal but not on the Commissioner; the Commissioner's
duty is simply "to keep under review" the Secretary of State's
functions. Review in this context neither means nor implies that
judicial review principles are appropriate, and it is submitted that
the Commissioner has misinterpreted his duty and is applying a
less rigorous standard than he should. The Commissioner also dis-
closes the number of warrants issued by the Home and Scottish
Secretaries (529 in 1987 and 519 in 1988), but believes it would
be prejudicial to national security to give a breakdown of these
figures or to reveal the number of warrants issued by the Foreign
and Northern Ireland Secretaries, 7 even though details of the
number of warrants issued by the Foreign Secretary have been re-
leased in the past. 9
72. Id. § 8(1).
73. Id. § 8(6).
74. Id. § 8(8).
75. Id. § 8(7).
76. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT 1985, CHAPTER 56: REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SIONER FOR 1988, at 2, para. 8, CM. 652 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER].
77. Id. at 5, app.
78. Id. at 1, para. 5.
79. HoME OFFICE, THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CMND.
9438, para. 11, 13, annex 2 (1985) [hereinafter HOME OFFICE] (The Foreign Secretary issued
136 warrants in 1980 and 115 in 1984.).
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Although this Act may not fully satisfy the requirements of the
European Convention on Human Rights, it does at least place this
important matter on a proper legal basis by providing safeguards
and review procedures, and to this extent represents a signal im-
provement in the law. This is one of several instances in recent
years in which a decision of the European Court of Human Rights
has provoked British law reform, forcing a government heretofore
reluctant to promote legislation to do so.
The evolution of the law on this subject in the United States
also has not been a model of coherence and lucidity. As in Britain,
warrantless wiretapping by the American executive was common,
and in 1928 in Olmstead v. United States,80 the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment had no application to such wire-
tapping. Warrantless wiretapping continued, even after the Federal
Communications Act of 1934,81 because the government took the
view that only disclosure of the material so obtained was forbid-
den. Olmstead survived challenge in the Supreme Court in the
1942 case of Goldman v. United States,82 but the contrary view
prevailed in 1967 in Katz v. United States,"' which held that the
fourth amendment protected people and privacy, not property and
places, except in national security cases. Following Katz, Congress
legislated in 1968 for electronic surveillance warrants in law en-
forcement cases,84 leaving national security to the President.8 5 This
exclusion, however, fell for domestic security purposes in 1972,88
but electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents remained
untouched.
Following grave concern about misuse of these powers8 7 and a
growing feeling that judicial warrants should govern all cases, Con
80. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
81. Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934).
82. 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
83. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
84. Title MI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968)).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968).
86. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
87. See, e.g., THE CHURCH CoMMITEE REPORT FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMM TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS wrrH REsPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACnvrTms,
Book II, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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gress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978,88
under which applications for warrants, already approved by the
Attorney General, must be submitted to a member of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. The court is composed of seven
district court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United
States, from whom appeal lies to a panel of three circuit court
judges similarly designated. 9 The procedure applies to surveillance
of foreign powers and agents that is "necessary" for "national de-
fense or foreign affairs, or the ability of the United States to pro-
tect against grave hostile acts, terrorism, sabotage, or clandestine
intelligence activities of a foreign power." 90 No warrant is needed if
only foreign powers are targeted.9 1 In the ten years since the Act's
passage, the court has not rejected one of more than 4,000 applica-
tions.2 Whether this is attributable to the vetting of applications
before they are submitted or to the judges being hoodwinked by
the security establishment cannot be known. The Act has success-
fully withstood a number of challenges in the courts.9"
If the American experience is any guide-and the American ju-
diciary is certainly not perceived to be supine-the British govern-
ment would have nothing to fear from entrusting decisions in these
cases to judges.
IV. THE SECURITY SERVICE
The Security Service (M15) was not a very well-kept secret. Al-
though it had a shadowy constitutional existence insofar as its
terms of reference had belatedly seen the light of day and it was
financed in consequence of a parliamentary vote in the annual Es-
timates,' it had no proper legal existence or foundation. The Ser-
88. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519 and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)).
89. Id. § 1803.
90. Id. §§ 1804(a)(7), 1801(e)(2).
91. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A), (B).
92. See Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten
Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. Ratv. 793, 814-15
(1989).
93. See id. at 816-20.
94. For early (and rare) references, see the Civil List and Secret Service Money Act 1782,
22 Geo. 3, ch. 82, §§ 24-28, repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1977, ch. 18, § 1(1)
and sched. 1, pt. II; The Government of Ireland Act 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 7, ch. 67, sched. 6,
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vice was responsible to the Home Secretary, although not a depart-
ment of the Home Office, and its Director-General had a right of
access to the Prime Minister." Security Service staff were Crown
servants appointed, as are all civil servants, in exercise of that part
of English law known as the royal prerogative, but they derived no
special powers thereby and carried out their duties within the ordi-
nary law in the way that any private citizen could. The only differ-
ence was that the Home Secretary might authorise them to tap
telephones or intercept mail. 8 If the exercise of police powers were
called for, security staff had to work with the police, whose Special
Branch served as the link between the two bodies.
Lord Denning, in his 1963 report on the Profumo affair, sum-
marised the position in characteristic style:
The Security Service in this country is not established by Stat-
ute nor is it recognised by Common Law. Even the Official
Secrets Acts do not acknowledge its existence. The members of
the Service are, in the eye of the law, ordinary citizens with no
powers greater than anyone else. They have no special powers of
arrest such as the police have. No special powers of search are
given to them. They cannot enter premises without the consent
of the householder, even though they may suspect a spy is
there.... They have, in short, no executive powers. They have
managed very well without them. We would rather have it so,
than have anything in the nature of a "secret police. '97
Lord Denning's successor as Master of the Rolls, however, tenta-
tively expressed a contrary opinion in the Spycatcher case. 98
In November 1988, without warning, prior public discussion or
the customary white paper, the government published the Security
Service Bill, modelled on the Interception of Communications Act
1985. By April 1989, it had reached the statute book without a sin-
para. MI(b)(iii), repealed by the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, ch. 36, § 41(1) and
sched. 6, pt. I.
95. See JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE SECURITY SERVICE IN THE LIGHT OF MR. PROFUMO'S
RESIGNATION: LoRD DENNING'S REPORT, para. 239, ChiNn. 2152 (1963) [hereinafter LORD DEN-
NING'S REPORT].
96. See supra Section III.
97. LORD DENNING'S REPORT, supra note 95, at 91, para. 273.
98. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 605 (per Sir John
Donaldson, M.R.).
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gle amendment: Not so much as a word or comma had been
altered.
The Home Secretary explained the bill's purpose as stemming
from concerns about how the Security Service operated and the
absence of machinery for dealing with complaints by people claim-
ing to have been subject to action by itY9 A more likely explana-
tion is that the absence of such machinery was, in all probability, a
breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, following
the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Leander
v. Sweden'00 in 1987. The Act does not affect the Secret Intelli-
gence Service (M16), perhaps because it operates only abroad (if
indeed that is so), which thus remains without any formal legal or
constitutional authority.
The Security Service's enigmatic past is not ignored, for section
1 of the Security Service Act 1989, in bringing the Service from the
shadows into the legitimate light of day, provides that "[t]here
shall continue to be a Security Service. . .under the authority of
the Secretary of State,"''1 its functions continuing "to be under
the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of
State."'01 2 The Director-General is also responsible for the Service's
"efficiency.''1o3
The bill aroused little public interest. Most parliamentary dis-
cussion focused on the question of some form of parliamentary su-
pervision or accountability and a strengthening of oversight, which
the government found wholly unacceptable and firmly resisted.
The functions of the Service are set out in the Act as:
the protection of national security and, in particular, its protec-
tion against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage,
from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions
intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy
by political, industrial or violent means. 104
99. Home Office News Release, Nov. 23, 1988 ("Statutory Basis for the Security
Service").
100. 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 9 E.H.R.R. 433 (1987).
101. Security Service Act 1989, ch. 5, § 1(1). See generally Leigh & Lustgarten, The Se-
curity Service Act 1989, 52 MOD. L. REv. 801 (1989).
102. Security Service Act 1989, § 2(1).
103. Id. § 2(2).
104. Id. § 1(2).
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. . . to safeguard the economic well-being of the United King-
dom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of per-
sons outside the British Islands."0 5
This replaced the 1952 Directive, which was in the following
terms:
"The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the coun-
try. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from exter-
nal and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and
sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether
directed from within or without the country, which may be
judged to be subversive of the State."106
The directive went on to require that the Service's work be strictly
limited to what was necessary for this task, stressing that the Ser-
vice should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influ-
ence or anything other than the defence of the realm as a whole
and that no inquiry was to be carried out for any government de-
partment unless it had a bearing on the defence of the realm.07
Lord Denning paraphrased the directive and defined subversion in
the following words:
[T]he cardinal principle [is] that their operations are to be used
for one purpose, and one purpose only, the Defence of the
Realm. They are not to be used so as to pry into any man's pri-
vate conduct, or business affairs: or even into his political opin-
ions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is, they would
contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful
means.
08
In the new statutory remit, "national security" and "parliamen-
tary democracy" are undefined. The remit also includes undermin-
ing parliamentary democracy by political and industrial means as
well as violence,10 9 and extends to undermining the country's "eco-
nomic well-being." 110
105. Id. § 1(3).
106. Lon DENNING'S REPORT, supra note 95, at 80, para. 238 (quoting 1952 Directive).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 77, para. 230.
109. Security Service Act 1989, § 1(2).
110. Id. § 1(2)-(3).
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According to the Home Secretary, the term "national security"
is well-understood and refers to the "survival or well-being of the
nation as a whole," as opposed to party or sectional interests;"11
but are we not entitled to something better in the statute when
dealing with a formidable secret agency of the state that is in-
vested with invasive powers affecting the privacy of citizens? The
American elaboration of national security-namely, national de-
fence and foreign relations-in a presidential order" 2 is scarcely
more illuminating. The White Paper preceding the Interception of
Communications Act, which also rests on the undefined concept of
"national security," offered, if not a definition, a working formula,
which, in addition to terrorist, espionage and major subversive ac-
tivity, referred to taking action "in support of the Government's
defence and foreign policies," ' 3 a form of words that assimilates
the government's policies of the day to the public interest and in-
deed national security. This is dangerously imprecise. While gov-
ernment policy may indeed involve the defence of the realm," 4 this
is not always the case, and the language should distinguish be-
tween the two situations, making clear that the justification for ac-
tion by the Security Service rests exclusively on protecting the in-
terests of the state, not in supporting government policy. Lloyd,
L.J., the Commissioner under the Interception of Communications
Act, has confirmed that national security goes beyond terrorism,
espionage and subversion. He gives defence against external ag-
gression as one example, but says "[fjurther than that I do not
think it would be wise or indeed possible to go. . . . Each case
must be judged on its merits."" 5
These British provisions contrast unfavourably with those found
in the corresponding Canadian legislation, which were introduced
following the exhaustive analysis and careful recommendations of
111. 143 PAnL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1104, 1105 (1988).
112. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 178 (1983).
113. HOME OFFICE, supra note 79, at 9, para. 21. See generally Spjut, Defining Subver-
sion, 6 BRIT. J.L. & Soc. 254 (1979).
114. Cf. Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 763 (evidence regarding
government policy as to the necessity of an airfield was properly excluded from inquiry as to
prejudice the safety or interests of the state).
115. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER, supra note 76, at 2, para. 10.
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the McDonald Commission.116 Section 2 of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act defines "threats to the security of Canada"
as:
(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detri-
mental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward
or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada
that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandes-
tine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or
in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against
persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political ob-
jective within Canada or a foreign state, and
(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful
acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the
destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally es-
tablished system of government in Canada, but does not include
lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunc-
tion with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to(d) .117
The Director-General of MI5 is responsible in particular for en-
suring that the Service only obtains or discloses information neces-
sary for the proper discharge of its functions, or to prevent or de-
tect serious crime." 8 Disclosures for the purpose of determining a
person's suitability for employment must be in accordance with
provisions approved by the Secretary of State." 9 The Director-
General must also ensure that the Service takes no action "to fur-
ther the interests of any political party, '120 but this laconic limita-
tion may be contrasted with the following passage in the 1952 Di-
rective, which previously governed the Service:
116. 1 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN AcTIvITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN
MOUNTED POLICE, SECOND REPORT, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER THE LAW 441-43 (1981)
[hereinafter COMMISSION OF INQUIRY].
117. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 32 & 33 Eliz. 2, ch. 21, § 2 (1984); see
Gill, Defining Subversion: The Canadian Experience Since 1977 [1989] PUB. L. 617.
118. Security Service Act 1989, ch. 5, § 2(2)(a).
119. See id. § 2(3).
120. See id. § 2(2)(b).
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"It is essential that the Security Service should be kept abso-
lutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing
should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it
is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the
community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the
Realm as a whole."' 21
The Director-General must make an annual report to the Prime
Minister and Secretary of State, and may report to either of them
at any other time.122 These reports will not be published.
More than two centuries ago, an English court decided a case
often celebrated as the most important in English constitutional
law. In that case, Lord Camden, C.J., dismissed contemptuously
the Secretary of State's claim to issue a warrant empowering the
King's Messengers to enter private property and search and seize
papers. 2 The Secretary of State argued that such a power was
essential to government in dealing with sedition, and the common
law must recognise a doctrine of state necessity. 24 But Lord Cam-
den would have none of this argument in the absence of specific
legislation and vindicated the principles of the inviolability of pri-
vate property and personal liberty and the subjection of Ministers
and officials to the ordinary law. 2 5 The decision was a triumph for
the common law and the principle of legality. If the claimed power
were supported, Lord Camden observed,
the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom
will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger,
whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even
to suspect, a person to be the author, printer or publisher of a
seditious libel. 12
He described the power, which he opined would be "subversive of
all the comforts of society,' 27 as:
121. LORD DENNING'S REPORT, supra note 95, para. 238 (quoting 1952 Directive).
122. Security Service Act 1989, § 2(4).
123. Entick v. Carrington, 19 St. Tr. 1029, 1064-66 (1765).
124. Id. at 1040-42.
125. Id. at 1064-69
126. Id. at 1063.
127. Id. at 1066.
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a power to seize that man's papers, who is charged upon oath to
be the author or publisher of a seditious libel; if used oppres-
sively, it acts against every man, who is so described in the war-
rant, though he be innocent.
It is executed against the party, before he is heard or even
summoned; and the information, as well as the informers, is
unknown.
It is executed by messengers . . . in the presence or the ab-
sence of the party, as the messengers shall think fit, and without
a witness to testify what passes at the time of the transaction; so
that when the papers are gone, as the only witnesses are the
trespassers, the party injured is left without proof.
If this injury falls upon an innocent person, he is as destitute
of remedy as the guilty: and the whole transaction is so guarded
against discovery, that if the officer should be disposed to carry
off a bank-bill, he may do it with impunity...
Such is the power, and therefore one should naturally expect
that the law to warrant it should be clear in proportion as the
power is exorbitant.1 28
Now, after 225 years, comes the legislation that eluded Secretary
of State Lord Halifax in 1765 and that furnishes this "exorbitant"
power with unmistakable clarity. Section 3(1) of the Security Ser-
vice Act provides that "[no] entry on or interference with property
shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by the Sec-
retary of State . ,, .I Entry, obviously surreptitious and there-
fore if necessary by force, is authorised to premises of any descrip-
tion, as is any "interference" 13 0 with property, a term left
undefined, but apt to cover, for example, search, seizure, copying,
bugging, damaging, destroying and tampering with-and all this is
on the authority, not of a judge (as, for example, in Canada),"' but
of a minister of the Crown if he thinks it necessary in order to
obtain information "likely to be of substantial value in assisting
the Service to discharge any of its functions" that cannot be ob-
128. Id. at 1064-66 (footnote omitted).
129. Security Service Act 1989, ch. 5, § 3(1).
130. Id.
131. Canadian Security InteUigence Service Act, 32 & 33 Eliz. 2, ch. 21, § 21 (1984).
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tained by other means."' A warrant remains valid for six
months. 133
This, if we are to believe Peter Wright and others,3 merely
makes legal what has long been common practice,3 5 albeit usually
without ministerial knowledge or approval.3 6 The Act gives the
authorisation power to a leading politician. The power is not pre-
mised on reasonable suspicion, as it is in Canada,137 for example, or
probable cause or any known legal formula; it is unrelated to any
alleged or suspected crime. The Act is modelled on the Intercep-
tion of Communications Act, but powers of entry, search and
seizure are measurably different in kind and degree from inter-
cepting communications, serious though that is. What would Lords
Camden and Denning have made of it? The Act is a long way from
the provision that proclaims "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation,"' 38 although
the fourth amendment's resonant words are not thought to pre-
clude the executive in the United States from authorising warrant-
less physical searches on national security grounds.3 9 The Home
Secretary believes that one should not underestimate the subse-
quent scrutiny of his exercise of the warrant power by the Security
132. Security Service Act 1989, § 3(2)(a).
133. See id. § 3(4)(a).
134. P. WRIGHT, supra note 6.
135. The allegations of "bugging" . . . related to the sort of activities that may
seem very distasteful to many right-thinking people but that it would be naive
in the extreme to suppose were not carried out by all security services from
time to time. Whether in relation to any particular occasion or any particular
premises the operations described were justifiable is a matter for the security
services and those to whom they are accountable, namely the Director-General,
the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister. Operations of this particular sort
require, in my opinion, to be protected by a cloak of secrecy. I do not under-
stand how a security service could operate if that were not so.
Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 587-88 (per
Scott, J.) (Spycatcher case).
136. Ministers have not normally been informed of the Service's day-to-day activities or
given detailed information obtained by the Service. LORD DENNING'S REPORT, supra note 95,
para. 238.
137. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 32 & 33 Eliz. 2, ch. 21, § 21.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
139. See Brown and Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelli-
gence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U.L. REV.
97, 107-37 (1985); Cinquegrana, supra note 92, at 821-23.
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Service Commissioner, who is a judge;140 but one may then ask why
the legislature did not entrust the power to issue warrants to the
judiciary. It is likely, if telephone-tapping warrants are a guide,141
that only a selection of warrants will be inspected. In any event,
only a particularly inept officer would put an application to the
Home Secretary in a way that did not almost guarantee success.
On the other side of the coin, the Act creates machinery for the
supervision and investigation of complaints. The Prime Minister
must appoint a senior judge as Security Service Commissioner; 14 a
Tribunal also exists, consisting of between three and five lawyers
appointed by the Queen, 14 which in practice means the Prime
Minister.
One duty of the Commissioner is to monitor the granting of war-
rants,4 and he is entitled to any information or documents from
the Service that he may require. 145 He must submit an annual re-
port to the Prime Minister,1 46 which, less any excisions necessary
to avoid prejudicing the Service's functioning,1 47 must be laid
before Parliament.14 He has no responsibility, however, in relation
to the Director-General's functions or the work of the Service in
general. Attempts in Parliament to secure the appointment of an
inspector-general failed. 149
The Commissioner's other duties, which he shares with the Tri-
bunal, relate to complaints. Any person, organisation or associa-
tion 50 aggrieved by anything that he believes the Service has done
in relation to him or his property, including any place where he
140. 143 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1104, 1107 (1988).
141. See REPORT OF THE COMMIssIONER, supra note 76, at 2, para. 8.
142. Security Service Act 1989, ch. 5, § 4(1). The first Commissioner is Stuart-Smith, L.J.
143. See id. § 5(1), sched. 2. The President is a High Court judge (Simon Brown, J.); the
other two members are a Scottish sheriff and a solicitor.
144. See id. § 4(3).
145. See id. § 4(4).
146. See id. § 4(5).
147. See id. § 4(7).
148. See id. § 4(6).
149. There are moves in the United States to establish a presidentially appointed Inspec-
tor General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Engelberg, C.I.A. Mounts Drive to Defeat
Plan for Outside Inspector, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Senators Want the
CIA Supervised, The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
150. Security Service Act 1989, § 5(1), sched. 1, para. 8(1).
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lives or works,151 may lodge a complaint with the Tribunal that,
unless judged frivolous or vexatious, the Tribunal must investi-
gate.152 Neither authority has jurisdiction to deal with more gen-
eral complaints, such as whether M15 has tried to "destabilise" the
government or smear a political party by rumours.
Once seized of a complaint, the Tribunal must first ascertain
whether the complainant has been the subject of inquiries by the
Service. 153 If the complainant has, the Tribunal must determine
whether there were "reasonable grounds" for instituting or contin-
uing the inquiries.'" If those inquiries took place because of the
complainant's "membership of a category of persons regarded by
the Service as requiring investigation," such as the Communist
Party, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the National Front
or a trade union or the Irish Republican Army, the Tribunal will
be concerned only with whether the Service had reasonable
grounds for believing him to be a member. 55 Any concern the Tri-
bunal has about whether the category merits investigation is re-
ferred to the Commissioner, 15 who may report on it to the Secre-
tary of State, who alone has power to deal with it. 57
When the complaint relates to the Service's disclosure of infor-
mation in connection with the complainant's suitability for partic-
ular employment, the Tribunal will investigate whether such dis-
closure occurred, and, if so, whether the Service had reasonable
grounds for believing the disclosed information to be true. 58 Any
complaint about property is referred to the Commissioner, who
will determine, applying judicial review principles, whether, in is-
suing any warrant under section 3, the Secretary of State "was act-
ing properly," and report back to the Tribunal accordingly. 159 The
scope of the review is thus a narrow one: The Home Secretary
151. See id., para. 8(2).
152. See id., para. 1.
153. See id., para. 2(1).
154. See id., para. 2(2), (3).
155. See id., para. 2(4). Surveillance of National Council for Civil Liberties staff by M15
in the 1970s has been held to be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Times (London), April 27, 1990, at 2, col. 6.
156. See id., para. 7(1).
157. See id., para. 7(3).
158. See id., para. 2(3).
159. See id., para. 4.
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must have acted unreasonably or for an improper purpose, for ex-
ample, to fall foul of this procedure.
When the Tribunal finds that the Service did not have reasona-
ble grounds for making the inquiries or believing that disclosed in-
formation was accurate, it informs the complainant that it has
made a determination in his favour 60 and reports its findings to
the Secretary of State and the Commissioner."1 The same is done
if the Commissioner finds in the complainant's favour in a prop-
erty case." 2 The Tribunal may order inquiries ended and any
records destroyed. 6 3 If the Tribunal finds that the Service did not
reasonably believe information relating to the complainant's suita-
bility for certain employment was true, the Tribunal may order the
Secretary of State to pay the complainant compensation as it de-
termines."'Furthermore, if the Commissioner has determined that
a warrant was improperly issued and should be quashed, he may
quash the warrant and direct the Secretary of State to pay such
compensation as the Commissioner has considered appropriate,1 65
When the Tribunal does not find in favour of the complainant
but believes nevertheless that the allegations make appropriate an
investigation into whether the Service has acted unreasonably in
relation to the complainant or his property, it can refer the matter
to the Commissioner who can report to the Secretary of State.'66
When the Tribunal does not make a finding in the complainant's
favour, that is all he may be told. 67 In no case may a complainant
be given any information, documents or reasons for any determina-
tion.16  Attempts in Parliament to judicialise proceedings before
the Tribunal were unsuccessful. 69
Decisions of the Tribunal and the Commissioner "(including de-
cisions as to their jurisdictions) shall not be subject to appeal or
160. See id., para. 5(1).
161. See id.
162. See id., para. 5(2).
163. See id., para. 6(1)(a).
164. See id., para. 6(1)(b).
165. See id., para. 6(2).
166. See id., para. 7(2), (3).
167. See id., para. 5(3).
168. See id. § 5(2), sched. 2, para. 4(2).
169. PARL. DEB., H.L., vol. 506, cols. 874-79 (Apr. 20, 1989); Rights Amendment Rejected,
The Times (London), Apr. 21, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
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liable to be questioned in any court." 170 This is known by English
administrative lawyers as an "ouster" clause, designed to exclude
the jurisdiction of the -courts. The addition of the words "including
decisions as to their jurisdictions" takes the exclusion further than
it normally goes and is an attempt to circumvent the judges who in
the past have severely limited the scope of ouster clauses. 171
Placing the Security Service on a statutory basis was right; sub-
jecting it to some independent oversight was right; establishing a
complaints mechanism was right. All these are welcome features of
the Act, although one may doubt whether a single judge as Com-
missioner, and a Tribunal that does not publish reasoned decisions
and cannot make any documentation or information available to
the complainant for comment, are the happiest solutions.
The Security Service's remit, with its lack of certainty and clar-
ity, the power given to the Home Secretary and Northern Irish
Secretary to issue warrants, and the absence of any parliamentary
scrutiny, which other major democracies have managed to accom-
modate,"" are all, however, seriously disturbing. One hopes that
improvements will be effected in the future. I do not for one mo-
ment doubt the need for a security service that works in secret; but
while such a service may be essential to preserve democracy, it is
also uniquely well-placed to undermine or destroy it. Reconciling
the need to work in secret with the necessary degree of oversight
and supervision to prevent the Service from threatening the demo-
cratic processes of the state is admittedly difficult. Politicians may
abuse the Service and employ it for improper ends, or may lose
political and parliamentary control of it. Both are grave dangers.
The McDonald Commission in Canada described the tensions
succinctly:
Effectiveness must not be the only standard for judging security
arrangements .... [I]t is essential that our security system also
meet the requirements of democracy. This means that because
Canada is a democratic country it must tolerate security risks
170. Service Security Act 1989, § 5(4).
171. See, e.g., H. WADE, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW 719 (6th ed. 1988).
172. Even in Poland, the Solidarity Government has taken steps to place the Interior
Ministry, which supervises the secret police, under parliamentary control. Boyes, Polish
Parliament Takes Control of Interior Ministry, The Times (London), Sept. 14, 1989, at 12,
col. 1.
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which a non-democratic' state would not .... [I]n Canada the
overriding objective of our security arrangements is the preser-
vation of our democratic system. It follows that our security sys-
tem must be assessed in terms both of its effectiveness and its
conformity with the requirements of democracy. 17
This message has yet to gain official acceptance in the United
Kingdom.
V. OFFICIAL SECRETS
The prolix section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911174 proved
remarkably resilient. In 455 words, it effectively made criminal the
disclosure or receipt of any official information of any description
for any purpose by almost anyone-Crown servant, government
contractor or person entrusted in confidence with the information.
An official committee recommended reform of the section eighteen
years ago;17 5 judges urged that it should be "pensioned-off"; 76
commentators universally described it as "discredited" for years.'
Yet prosecutions continued and the section defied repeated at-
tempts, even by the present government, to replace it. Despite a
consensus that section 2 was overbroad in its reach and should be
replaced, there was no common ground on what a new law should
say or how its objects might be achieved. On the one hand were
fears that a new law would continue to inhibit public knowledge
and discussion by controlling the supply of information too
strictly; on the other hand were anxieties that a much curtailed law
would release information too freely and do genuine damage to the
public interest and national security. These opposing forces com-
bined to preserve the 1911 Act in the face of protracted and uni-
versal condemnation.
Last year, however, a new Official Secrets Act 7 8 reached the
statute book, but not without fierce parliamentary debate and
173. COMMISSION OF INQUmY, supra note 116, at 407-08, pt. V, ch. 1, para. 5.
174. Official Secrets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28.
175. 1 DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT 1911: RE-
PORT OF THE CoMMrrrm, CMND. 5104 (1972) (Chairman: Lord Franks) [hereinafter FRANKS
REPORT].
176. Griffith, The Official Secrets Act 1989, 16 J.L. & Soc. 273, 274 (1989).
177. Id. at 275.
178. Official Secrets Act 1989, ch. 6.
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much obloquy heaped upon it. It is nevertheless a distinct im-
provement on the 1911 vintage that it supersedes.
In place of the blanket coverage of all official information, crimi-
nal sanctions are now applied only to disclosures of certain identi-
fied categories of information, 19 and indeed the list is shorter than
that recommended by the Franks Committee in 1972.1l s In most
cases, the prosecution must prove that the disclosure was damag-
ing in fact. Unlike previous attempts at reform and the Franks
proposals, there is no ministerial role in certifying that the infor-
mation was classified or confidential; the jury must determine
whether the information falls within one of the listed categories
and, where necessary, whether its disclosure was harmful. Merely
receiving official information is no longer an offence. The Act also
covers fewer categories of public servants.' 8l These all represent
notable improvements and deserve to be welcomed.
Much opposition to the bill centred on the absence of a public
interest defence under which "whistle-blowing" would attract no
penalty, and a prior publication defence, both of which the govern-
ment found unacceptable. 8 2 To constitute an offence under the
Act, every disclosure must be made "without lawful authority," but
this is confined to disclosures made in accordance with official
duty.8 3 Critics also raised objections about the absence of a need
to prove damage when the disclosure was by a member of the se-
curity or intelligence services, 84 the inclusion of international rela-
tions in the list of proscribed subjectsi' 5 and the absence of any
right of access to other official information.
179. Id.
180. See FRANKS REPORT, supra note 175, at para. 278.1-.13.
181. In addition to Ministers, civil servants, members of the Armed Forces and police
officers, Official Secrets Act 1989, § 12(1)(a)-(e), the Secretary of State may prescribe other
bodies and offices within the scope of the Act. Id. § 12(1)(f), (g). The Official Secrets Act
1989 (Prescription) Order 1990 (S.I. 1990, Feb. 8), made under § 14 of the Act, brings bodies
such as the Atomic Energy Authority and British Nuclear Fuels within the Act, but omits
such bodies as the National Health Service, Post Office and British Telecom, which were
covered by the 1911 Act. See Home Office News Releases, Dec. 18, 1989 ("Prescription Or-
der to Narrow Scope of Official Secrets Legislation") and Feb. 28, 1990 ("Official Secrets Act
Comes into Force Tomorrow").
182. Griffith, supra note 176, at 279.
183. Official Secrets Act 1989, ch. 6, § 7(1).
184. Id. § 1(1).
185. See id. § 3.
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Prosecutions may be brought only with the consent of the Attor-
ney General186 or, in the case of disclosures relating to crime, the
Director of Public Prosecutions.87 The maximum penalty is two
years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine, 88 unless the offence is
tried summarily in the magistrates' court, if the accused agrees, in
which case the maximum penalties are six months' imprisonment
and a fine of £2,000.189 The Act is extra-territorial'90 and would
cover Mr. Wright's publication of Spycatcher in Australia and the
United States, although the Act does not overcome the problem
that the suspect is beyond the jurisdiction of the British courts.
There are four main categories of information disclosure of
which is an offence: security and intelligence; defence; interna-
tional relations; and crime and special investigation powers.
A. Security and Intelligence
Disclosure without lawful authority of any information or docu-
ment relating to security or intelligence by a member or former
member of the security and intelligence services that came into his
possession by virtue of his work is an offence.' 9' A minister may
notify anyone who undertakes work connected with the security
and intelligence services that the worker is subject to the terms of
the section in like manner.192 "Security and intelligence services"
are not defined, and whether it refers only to those working in MI5
and M16, or whether it includes, for example, staff of GCHQ or
military intelligence is not clear. In view of the notification system
and the fact that the Act is a penal statute, the preferred interpre-
tation is a narrow reading that covers only those working for the
Security Service and the Intelligence Service. Whether the disclo-
sure is true or false does not matter; the Act covers anything pur-
porting to be a disclosure or intended to be taken as a disclosure. 93
This may look absurd at first blush, but it is necessary; otherwise a
186. See id. § 9(1).
187. See id. § 9(2).
188. See id. § 10(l)(a).
189. See id. § 10(1)(b). There are some minor exceptions.
190. See id. § 15(1).
191. See id. § 1(1).
192. See id. § 1(1)(b), (6).
193. See id. § 1(2).
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prosecution could fail either because the government denied the
defendant's allegation as being true or because the defendant per-
suaded the jury that he fabricated the disclosed information.
In the case of a member or former member of the security ser-
vices, no proof of harm or damage is required, although the de-
fendant can claim as a defence that he did not know and had no
reasonable cause to believe that the information related to security
or intelligence.'" A disclosure of security and intelligence informa-
tion by other Crown servants or government contractors, however,
is an offence only if "damaging,"' 9 5 which means "it causes damage
to the work of, or of any part of, the security and intelligence ser-
vices,' 96 or is likely to cause that damage.197 Such damage may be
caused by the disclosure of the particular document, whose con-
tents are sensitive, or because the document in question falls
within a class or description whose disclosure is likely to be damag-
ing.198 No offence is committed if such a defendant can prove that
he did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that the dis-
closure would be damaging.'99
Revelations of illegal security activities are caught by this provi-
sion and no general public interest defence is available. Should not
the protection of the criminal law be confined to the proper and
lawful activities of the Security Service, easily done now that it is a
creature of statute and its functions have been statutorily
delineated? 200
This absolute lifelong ban on security and intelligence personnel
gives explicit recognition in the criminal law to the government's
basic argument in the Spycatcher case,201 even though that case
was a civil action for injunctive relief founded on the equitable
doctrine of confidentiality. The 1911 Act imposed no less stringent
194. See id. § 1(5).
195. See id. § 1(3).
196. See id. § 1(4)(a).
197. See id. § 1(4)(b).
198. See id.
199. See id. § 1(5).
200. See Leigh & Lustgarten, The Security Service Act 1989, 52 MOD. L. RE v. 801, 803-09
(1989).
201. See Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545,
552.
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a ban,s02 but it did so indiscriminately, lumping the retired or serv-
ing M15 officer together with the retired Ministry of Agriculture
tea lady and highly sensitive defence or intelligence information
with the number of biscuits consumed in the White Fish Sec-
tion.203 But neither this provision, nor the Security Service Act in
general, has anything to say about the civil law that featured in
Spycatcher, which is unchanged and remains in judicial hands, al-
though the statutory framework may have a bearing on a particu-
lar case in which an individual is seeking to escape from his basic
obligation of confidentiality. The government may, of course, per-
mit a retired officer to publish accounts of his work, but this situa-
tion will be rare and permitted only in exceptional
circumstances.204
B. Defence
Disclosure of damaging information about defence by a present
or former Crown servant or government contractor is an offence. 20 5
A disclosure is "damaging" if:
(a) it damages [replacing the earlier "prejudices"] the capabil-
ity of, or of any part of, the armed forces of the Crown to carry
out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of
those forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations
of those forces; or
(b) . . . it endangers the interests of the United Kingdom
abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the
United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of
British citizens abroad; or
(c) . . . [if] its ... disclosure would be likely to have any of
those effects.206
Paragraph (b) is very broad and seems to have little relation to
defence.
202. See Official Secrets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, § 2.
203. The Official Secrets Act 1911 forbade "any person" from disclosing protected infor-
mation. See id.
204. 145 PAmL. DE., H.C. (6th ser.) 1047, 1104 (1989); 147 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1001,
1032-33 (1989).
205. See Official Secrets Act 1989, § 2(1).
206. Id. § 2(2).
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An accused may raise the defence that he did not know or have
reasonable cause to believe that the information would be damag-
ing or was related to defence.20 7 Information related to defence is
limited to details concerning the armed forces, their weapons and
equipment, defence policy and strategy, military planning and in-
telligence, and plans relating to essential supplies and services
needed in wartime.20 8
C. International Relations
A damaging disclosure by a present or former Crown servant or
government contractor of any information relating to international
relations or of any confidential information obtained from another
state or international organisation is an offence.20 9 Such a disclo-
sure is damaging if "it endangers the interests of the United King-
dom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the
United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of Brit-
ish citizens abroad," or if its disclosure would be likely to have any
of those effects. 210 The nature or contents of a document or the
mere fact that the document is confidential may suffice to establish
that the disclosure was damaging.2 11 Again, the defendant may
raise the defence that he did not know and had no reasonable
cause to believe that the information related to international rela-
tions or was confidential information obtained from another state
or international organisation, or that its disclosure would be
damaging.212
D. Crime and Special Investigation Powers
A present or former Crown servant or government contractor
commits an offence if he discloses any information relating to war-
rants under the Interception of Communications and Security Ser-
vice Acts (these are the "special investigation powers"),213 or which
207. See id. § 2(3).
208. See id. § 2(4).
209. See id. § 3(1).
210. See id. § 3(2).
211. See id. § 3(3).
212. See id. § 3(4).
213. See id. § 4(1), (3).
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results in the commission of an offence, facilitates an escape from
legal custody or prejudices the safekeeping of prisoners, or impedes
the prevention or detection of offences or the apprehension or
prosecution of suspects, or is likely to have any of these effects.214
The definition of Crown servant for the purposes of the Act in-
cludes police officers,2 15 although strictly speaking they are neither
servants of the Crown nor civil servants. Once again, the defendant
may raise the defence that he did not know or have reasonable
cause to believe that any of these effects would result,216 or that
the information was covered by the section.2
17
E. Other Categories
The Act prohibits two other categories of unlawful disclosure.
One category relates to security and intelligence, defence or inter-
national relations matters that the British Government has com-
municated in confidence to another government or international
organisation. A person commits an offence if information included
in this category is leaked to him and he, knowing or having reason-
able cause to believe that the information is covered by the Act,
then makes a damaging disclosure of it.21 '
The other category concerns recipients of information covered
by the Act, whether the information has been received unlawfully
or lawfully on a confidential basis, who then disclose that informa-
tion, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe-this being for
the Crown to prove-that the information is protected under the
Act.219 Such a disclosure is an offence only if it is damaging.220 This
section governs the media when they receive information leaked by
a civil servant or someone else to whom the information was en-
trusted in confidence. It is not necessary for the Crown to prove
any resulting damage when the disclosure relates to crime or spe-
cial investigation powers. 2 With regard to crime, a test of damage
214. See id. § 4(1), (2).
215. See id. § 12(1)(e).
216. See id. § 4(4).
217. See id. § 4(5).
218. See id. § 6.
219. See id. § 5.
220. See id. § 5(3)(a).
221. See id. § 4.
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would be otiose because the information is defined in terms of its
inherently injurious effects; but with regard to special investigation
powers-warrants to tap telephones and allow the Security Service
to enter and interfere with property-disclosure of the information
alone will suffice, giving rise to the absurd result that information
leaked to an individual that the Security Service had tapped his
telephone pursuant to a warrant could not then be repeated by his
member of Parliament (other than in the House of Commons
where all speech is privileged) to whom he had taken his grievance,
or by a newspaper.
In general, I welcome this Act and congratulate the former
Home Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, almost as strongly as I have
excoriated him elsewhere in this Article for other measures. That is
not to say I am insensitive to the Act's defects, but controversial
reforming legislation is seldom perfect.
The overriding criticism is the absence of a public interest de-
fence, supported amongst others by a former Prime Minister, For-
eign Secretary, two Home Secretaries and a Lord Chancellor, for
officials who wish to expose crime, fraud, abuse of authority, neg-
lect in the performance of official duty or other misconduct. Al-
though the government believed that adequate internal mecha-
nisms were available to officials to ventilate matters of this kind
and that the disclosure of these improprieties could not justify
damaging the public interest in the ways prescribed by the Act, its
obduracy on this point should be deplored. Internal mechanisms
may not always prove effective, and the object of eliminating
abuse, corruption and dishonesty in the country's government is of
the first importance. Moreover, in the case of security and intelli-
gence personnel, and in relation to the "special investigation pow-
ers"-warrants under the Interception of Communications and Se-
curity Service Acts-the Act is premised on an irrebuttable
assumption that every unauthorised disclosure is damaging. 2' It is
regrettable that the government did not allow a limited defence
when all the circumstances rendered communication of the infor-
mation reasonable, or when all proper and reasonable efforts to
have the matter investigated internally had failed. Such a defence
would not have emasculated the Act; it would have resulted in an
222. See id. § 4.
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Act that commanded greater confidence and support. Such a de-
fence did possibly feature in the 1911 Act,223 although the trial
judge in R. v. Ponting224 refused so to interpret it. The jury in
Ponting nevertheless acquitted in the face of the evidence and the
judge's summing up and direction, 215 and the Attorney General de-
clined to refer this important point of law for consideration by the
Court of Appeal. As it is, future prosecutions may founder, as did
Ponting's.
Less compelling was the argument. to allow a prior publication
defence, permitting the disclosure of any protected information
that had been published previously. Suppose the prior publication
occurred abroad or in some obscure technical journal or handbill or
pamphlet or in a foreign language; suppose it was expressed in dif-
ficult technical language. The government was surely right to
maintain that merely because the information had surfaced some-
where previously did not exclude the possibility that further publi-
cation might be damaging-that issue in any prosecution being a
matter for the jury. If the fresh publication has not added materi-
ally to the damage caused by the earlier disclosure, the jury will
not convict.
Another change urged on the government was substituting a test
of "serious injury" for "damage," as the Franks Committee had
recommended.2 6 At first sight this alternative test seems attrac-
tive, but I doubt if it would have made much difference in practice,
in view of the way in which the various kinds of damage are enun-
ciated in the Act. Arguably, any damage of the kind specified in
the Act, when caused by a civil servant, is apt for criminal penal-
ties; and, the requirement of the Attorney General's consent and
ultimately the jury's power to acquit provide protection against
trivial prosecutions.
Moreover, the Franks proposal operated in a different context.
Under that proposal, under the categories of information to be cov-
223. See Official See ets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, § 2(1)(a). "If any person...
communicates... ir anation to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorised
to communicate it, or to a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to
communicate it . .. that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour." Id. (emphasis added).
224. [1985] Cl m L.R. -318.
225. See id.
226. See FRANKs REPORT, supra note 175, paras. 120, 144-69, 278.6.
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ered, ministers would have decided to classify particular docu-
ments if their "unauthorised disclosure would cause at least serious
injury to the interests of the nation, 22 7 but in any prosecution the
court or jury would not be concerned whether the classification was
appropriate or with the effects of the disclosure. The Act advances
considerably from that.
These reforms will do nothing to defuse the demands for free-
dom of information legislation, however, and dismantling criminal
sanctions will certainly not lead to the release of any additional
information. That debate will continue unabated.
VI. ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1989228 re-enacts with modifications the Act of 1984 bearing the
same title, following a Review of the earlier statute,229 which was
itself a reincarnation of similarly named statutes of 1974 and
1976.230 The Act principally deals with proscribed organisations,
exclusion orders, financial assistance for terrorism, and related
powers of arrest and detention.
The Act proscribes two organisations-the Irish Republican
Army and the Irish National Liberation Army2Sl-and the Secre-
tary of State may proscribe, with parliamentary approval,23 2 other
organisations that he believes to be "concerned in, or in promoting
or encouraging, terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. ' '23 3 The Act defines
terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any
section of the public in fear. 2 34 The Act makes punishable, in rela-
227. Id. at para. 278.6.
228. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, ch. 4. See generally Bon-
ner, Combating Terrorism in the 1990s: The Role of the Prevention of Terrorism (Tempo-
rary Provisions) Act 1989 [1989] PUB. L. 440.
229. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVI-
SIONs) ACT 1984 BY THE VISCOUNT COLVMLE OF CULROSS Q.C., CM. 264 (1987) [hereinafter
LORD COLVILLE'S REVIEW].
230. See generally D. BONNER, EMERGENCY PowERs IN PEACETIME chs. 3-4 (1985).
231. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, § 1(1), sched. 1.
232. See id. § 1(3)(a).
233. Id. § 1(2)(a).
234. Id. § 20(1).
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tion to any proscribed organisation, membership, inviting support,
arranging meetings,23 5 contributing or soliciting funds,2 6 and wear-
ing any item of dress indicative of membership or support.37
Part II of the Act empowers the Secretary of State to make or-
ders prohibiting a person believed to be concerned with terrorism
in relation to Northern Ireland from being in or entering Great
Britain (the mainland of England, Scotland and Wales). 238 This cu-
rious power of internal exile-described by Lord Colville in his Re-
view as "the most draconian in the ... Act"2 s--enables the Sec-
retary of State to "banish" a British citizen to Northern Ireland if
the citizen has lived on the mainland for less than three years240
and to exclude a citizen resident in Ulster from entering any other
part of the United Kingdom.2 41 The Secretary of State may also
make exclusion orders to prevent any person from entering or re-
maining in Northern Ireland.242 The Secretary of State may also
make orders against non-citizens-in practice these are usually
Irish citizens who are not subject to normal immigration con-
trol-to prevent them from being in or entering the United King-
dom.2 43 A person against whom the Secretary of State has made an
exclusion order may make representations to a person or panel
nominated by the Secretary of State2 44 and thereby force the Sec-
retary of State to reconsider the matter. 45 In practice, the Home
Secretary follows the adviser's or panel's recommendation. The
Secretary of State issued nineteen new exclusion orders between
1984 and 1986. In five of those cases, the excluded persons made
representations, and the Secretary of State revoked two of the or-
ders.2 46 The largest number of exclusion orders made annually by
the Home Secretary for Great Britain is fifty-three (in both 1978
235. See id. § 2(1).
236. See id. § 10(1).
237. See id. § 3(1).
238. See id. § 5.
239. LORD COLVLLE'S REVIEw, supra note 229, at 40, parm. 11.7.1.
240. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, § 5(4)(a).
241. See id. § 7(2).
242. See id. § 6.
243. See id. § 7.
244. See id., sched. 2, para. 3.
245. See id., para. 4.
246. See LORD CoLvIuLE's REviEw, supra note 229, at 39, para. 11.3.1.
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and 1979), the smallest is three. The annual average for the period
1976 to 1986 is twenty-three.2 47
Viscount Colville of Culross, Q.C., a former Conservative Home
Office Minister, argued cogently against exclusion orders in his
1987 Review of the Act. He wrote:
Exclusion orders deprive certain people of the right to move
freely around the United Kingdom and to live where they
please. The evidence against them is not tested in a court of law
nor made known to the person excluded and it is possible that
some of it may be inaccurate. Similar secrecy may be a feature
of certain cases under the Immigration Act 1971, in which peo-
ple are debarred from entering the country on the grounds that
their admission to the United Kingdom would not be conducive
to the public good; but that power is exercised rarely, and never
against British citizens.
Exclusion orders can divide families, make it difficult to seek a
job and difficult too to get away from former terrorist associates.
These restrictions are only feasible because there is a stretch of
sea between Ireland and Great Britain. It cannot be envisaged
that such a power could be exercised against Scottish or Welsh
separatists however terroristic their activities. It cannot be used
against naturalised or British-born citizens from other countries
who become caught up with disputes from overseas and resort to
terrorism in Britain. Moreover when a republican terrorist is ex-
cluded to Ireland the event is turned into useful propaganda. It
should not be forgotten that one of the aims of terrorism is to
lead a Government to introduce repressive measures; the unpop-
ularity thus caused can be exploited further to excite criticism
and turmoil as part of a vicious circle. The number of orders is
now greatly reduced. I obtained the impression that the authori-
ties in Northern Ireland would not encounter problems of any
substance if exclusion orders were to disappear; although by
contrast orders excluding people to the Province do add to the
heavy load already borne by the RUC and the armed forces.48
He conceded some advantages, but was "not convinced that the
ends justify these means." 49 He recommended accordingly that
247. Id. at 38, para. 11.2.1.
248. Id. at 39, para. 11.4.1.
249. Id. at 40, para. 11.6.1.
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the power to make exclusion orders should not be included in the
new Act. "I express the view," he concluded, "that it would be...
correct . . both in terms of civil rights in the United Kingdom
and this country's reputation in that respect among the Interna-
tional Community."25 0 Unhappily, the government rejected his
advice.
Part IV of the Act deals with police powers. A police officer may
arrest without warrant a person whom the officer reasonably sus-
pects of being "concerned in the commission, preparation or insti-
gation of acts of terrorism. '151 Terrorism is not a specific criminal
offence. The police may detain a person so arrested for forty-eight
hours,252 which the Secretary of State may extend by five addi-
tional days.253 A senior police officer who has not been involved
directly in the case reviews detention prior to the Secretary of
State's decision.24
The absence of any judicial supervision during the seven-day de-
tention period led in 1988 to the European Court of Human
Rights' finding in Brogan v. U.K.,2 56 by 12 to 7 in plenary session,
that this power violated article 5(3) of the European Convention
on Human Rights, under which "[e]veryone arrested or detained
... shall be brought promptly ["aussitat" in the French text,
meaning "immediately"] before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power."25
The government maintained that the seven-day period was es-
sential and that the sensitivity of the information on which deten-
tion was based rendered its presentation to a court in the presence
of the detainee impossible.257 Although in the Court's view there
250. Id.
251. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, § 14(1)(b).
252. See id. § 14(4).
253. See id. § 14(5). Tape recording of interviews with suspected terrorists on an experi-
mental basis began in March 1990. 168 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) W.A 272 (Mar. 1, 1990).
254. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, sched. 3, paras. 3-4.
255. 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 11 E.H.R.R. 117 (1988); see Bonner, supra note 230, at
446-52; Finnie, The Prevention of Terrorism Act and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 52 MoD. L. REv. 703 (1989). The Court did not, however, award compensation. 162-B
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
256. Brogan, 11 E.H.R.R. at 132, para. 55 (citing European Convention on Human Rights,
art. 5(3)).
257. Lord Colville agreed. See LoRD CoLvuxE's REviEw, supra note 229, ch. 12, at 43-44.
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was some room for flexible interpretation of the provision under
special circumstances, such interpretation could not be taken to
the point of impairing the very essence of the right, which would
effectively negative the state's obligation to ensure a prompt ap-
pearance before a judicial authority."' Even four days without ju-
dicial authority fell outside the strict constraints permitted by arti-
cle 5(3). As the Court concluded: "The undoubted fact that the
arrest and detention of the applicants were inspired by the legiti-
mate aim of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is
not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific re-
quirements of Article 5(3)."' 259
The government was not willing to amend the law so as to bring
it into conformity with the Convention, even though the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Bill was before Parliament at the time. The old
section was re-enacted without modification and the government
instead derogated from the Convention under article 15, which
permits states to do so "[in time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation . . . to the extent strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation."2 ' The government does
not believe that a judicial mechanism can be incorporated into the
law; accordingly, derogation from the Convention remains the per-
261manent response.
Derogation itself can be challenged before the Commission and
Court, and is subject to judicial supervision in Strasbourg.262 The
Court has recognised previously the existence of a "public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation" in Northern Ireland,
where the detentions in Brogan took place, and upheld the United
Kingdom's derogation.26 3 Although that characterisation may ap-
pear difficult to apply to Britain, states are accorded a wide margin
of appreciation in this respect.264 Derogations are permissible, how-
258. Brogan, 11 E.H.R.R. at 134, para. 59.
259. Id. at 136, para. 62.
260. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 15(1).
261. 160 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) W.A. 209-10 (Nov. 14, 1989).
262. See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1 E.H.R.R. 15, 30-35 (1961); Ireland v. U.K., 2
E.H.R.R. 25, 91-92 (1978); J. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 307-13 (2d ed. 1987).
263. See Ireland v. U.K., 2 E.H.R.R. at 91, para. 205.
264. See id. at 91, para. 207.
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ever, only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, '2 5 and the Court may require some convincing that the
situation could not accommodate a judicial stage in the detention
procedure. In due course, therefore, the Court may find a further
violation.
Between 1974, when this power of arrest and detention was first
introduced, and 1986, 6,246 persons were detained, of whom only
515 were charged with any offence,2 6 giving, as Lord Colville ac-
knowledged in his Review of the Act, "prima facie some cause for
concern. '26 7 His modest proposal, adopted in the new Act,268 was
for a senior police officer who had not been involved directly in the
case to review a detention during the initial forty-eight hours.269
Another unusual provision in the Act criminalises a failure to
disclose to the police information that may prevent acts of terror-
ism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, or that may
secure someone else's apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a
terrorist offence.270 The government rejected Lord Colville's recom-
mendation that this provision be abolished.7 1
Finally, the Act prohibits soliciting, receiving, giving or control-
ling any money or property in support of acts of terrorism, not
only in connection with Northern Ireland, and on conviction any
such money or property may be forfeited. 2  These provisions also
target bankers and financiers who may be knowingly involved in
the laundering of terrorists' funds. The Act includes elaborate pro-
visions to make forfeiture an effective weapon in the attack on
terrorism. 273
265. Id. at 91, para. 203.
266. See LORD COLVILLE'S REvIEw, supra note 229, at 15, para. 5.2.3. The latest figures
available show that in the 12 months 1988-89, 178 persons were detained, 30 of them for
more than 48 hours, and 26 were subsequently charged with an offence. HOME OFFICE STA-
TIsTIcAL BULLETIN, Statistics on the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Legisla-
tion-Third Quarter 1989, Issue 36/89, Oct. 31, 1989.
267. LORD COLViLLE'S REVIEW, supra note 229, at 15, para. 5.2.5.
268. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, sched. 3, paras. 3-4.
269. See LORD COLviLLE's REviEw, supra note 229, at 15, para. 5.3.2.
270. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, § 18(1).
271. See LORD CoLvu.LE's Rnvrmw, supra note 229, ch. 15, at 50-51.
272. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, pt. I, §§ 9-13.
273. See id. sched. 4.
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I do not seek to minimise the scourge of terrorism in Britain in
relation to both Northern Ireland and international affairs, to say
nothing of the carnage in Northern Ireland itself. There has been
much loss of life and damage to property; precautions against ter-
rorist attacks pervade public life and are enormously costly. The
state has an obligation to protect its people. Special legislation is
therefore not inadmissible in principle, but critical scrutiny must
not be suspended. If legislation erodes civil liberties too far, the
cure becomes as bad as the disease, and indeed the terrorists have
scored a partial victory, for they have succeeded in destroying part
of the nation's culture and values. In any case, terrible though ter-
rorism in Britain is, and great though our vigilance and precau-
tions must be, terrorism has not reached proportions calling for
major incursions into human rights. How,. then, does the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act emerge from this critical scrutiny?
The new measures on financial assistance for terrorism are
worthwhile and, like corresponding powers for drug trafficking," 4
should be welcomed. Let us hope they will have some impact. I
find it difficult, however, to be equally enthusiastic about the rest
of the legislation.
Until the appalling Birmingham bombing in 1974, which pro-
duced the first of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, successive gov-
ernments had claimed that proscribing the IRA would only drive it
further underground and thereby impede security efforts. The re-
versal of policy in 1974 was nothing but a futile gesture to demon-
strate to the public, outraged by the terrorists, that the govern-
ment was taking firm, immediate and decisive action. This reversal
in policy was irrelevant in the fight against terrorism, although I
see no objection in principle to banning an organisation whose self-
proclaimed purpose is the ruthless use of violence for political ends
in a democratic society.
Exclusion orders, in Lord Colville's considered judgment, con-
tribute little to security and constitute a serious interference with
fundamental rights.275 Regrettably, the government saw fit to ig-
274. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (provisions for confiscation of proceeds);
Criminal Justice Act 1988, § 69 and pt. VI (provisions for forfeiture and confiscation of
proceeds).
275. LORD COLVILLE'S RE ViEW, supra note 229, at 39, para. 11.4.1.
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nore his recommendation that they be abolished. Likewise, the of-
fence of withholding information, which represents a departure
from the normal principles of criminal liability, has been pre-
served, contrary to Lord Colville's advice. He should have been
heeded. The conclusion of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Brogan case should also have been heeded.27 6 The United
Kingdom's cause is not helped when it appears not only to have
violated an international human rights instrument, but also to con-
tinue to flout the Brogan judgment by the device of derogation.
Actions of this kind play into the hands of the terrorists and their
apologists. Situations may well arise in which derogation from
human rights obligations is understandable and indeed required,
but in this case the government could easily have avoided deroga-
tion either by shortening the period of detention or by introducing
a judicial element into the procedure.
CONCLUSION
With the tour of Britain's national security topography com-
plete, the inspiration for the imaginary country described in the
introduction will no longer be a mystery. It was, of course, a ten-
dentious caricature, though not factually inaccurate save for the
substitution of "Minister of the Interior" for Home Secretary, with
its connotations of secret police and state repression.Y
One can easily heap ridicule on the bizarre world of spies,
agents, secret services and so on-and the inglorious record of M15
and M16 since the Second World War makes that easier-but I
accept unreservedly the need for a security service and for appro-
priate laws to combat terrorism and subversion. That is not to give
the government a blank cheque or to concede that proper regula-
tion and controls are unnecessary, however. On the contrary, secret
operations call for special, rigorous arrangements that recognise
the dangers they pose to the democratic state. Believing that such
dangers are wholly imaginary or illusory is folly.
276. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
277. The comments about the press' being on probation referred to in the Introduction
were made by the Minister of State at the Home Office, Mr. Timothy Renton, M.P., during
debate on the Right of Reply Bill. See 151 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 561, 593 (1989).
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We have heard much of "national security," but part of the ex-
planation for the actions I have talked about lies in national inse-
curity. I do not mean a government fearful either for the survival
of the state or of itself-rarely has Britain had a more confident
government-but an insecurity emanating from a lack of confi-
dence in the resilience, adaptability, reliability and effectiveness of
the ordinary democratic and legal processes. The measures I have
discussed do not arise from a deep hostility to freedom or civil lib-
erties as such. They are, for the most part, authentic and sincere
responses to genuine problems, but they do evince a lack of regard
for civil liberties. In wrestling with these problems and devising
solutions, the principles of liberty are too often valued insuffi-
ciently. These principles seemingly compete on equal terms, and if
further measures of restraint or interference appear desirable, the
balance falls in favour of repression.
This is especially so when national security is invoked, which is
done all too readily, and fundamental principles of civil liberties
are effaced. We need to be much more skeptical when national se-
curity is raised, and we should be willing to eclipse cherished liber-
ties only if a compelling case can be made out.
Many of the powers discussed in this Article are both unneces-
sary and an affront to democracy. You may think, as I do, that a
Cabinet Minister who can tap telephones, open mail, search and
seize, burgle and bug, ban television and radio programmes and
banish citizens has powers that are nothing short of remarka-
ble-perhaps even shocking-in a parliamentary democracy (to
borrow a phrase from the Security Service Act); and that a govern-
ment that refuses to sanction whistle-blowing, ihat bans civil ser-
vants' trade union membership rights without consultation or dis-
cussion, that will not tolerate full independent and parliamentary
scrutiny of the Security Service, that circumvents a binding judg-
ment of the European Court of Human Rights and that will not
countenance a judicial role in reviewing detention following arrest,
is exhibiting questionable judgment. The survival of a free society,
to which these measures are, paradoxically, devoted, calls for
greater sensitivity and refinement. "Security," said Justice Barak
of the Israeli Supreme Court, "[is] not a goal in itself, but a means
820 [Vol. 31:773
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to a goal. The goal [is] a democratic regime, a regime of the people
recognising the freedoms of the individual. '278
278. Jerusalem Post, Jan. 20, 1989, at 5 (attributing to Barak, J., from Schnitzer v. Shani
(Chief Military Censor) (H.C. 680/88)).
